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Locke and the Politics and Theology 
of Toleration
Timothy Stanton
University of York
Locke’s theory of toleration has been understood to rest on the claim that persecution was insufficient
to instil either (i) true or (ii) sincere belief in people.Although Locke did indeed make both these claims,
neither was fundamental to his theory. Locke was principally concerned to deny that persecution was
necessary to instil true or sincere belief; its insufficiency to those ends he, and his contemporaries, took
for granted. His denial of the necessity of persecution presupposed that human beings were, in princi-
ple, naturally adequate to the discovery of God’s wants for them.The same presupposition, which derives
from natural theology, underwrote the views in politics and revealed theology that complete his theory
and supplied its moral content. Contemporary theories of toleration purposing to proceed on Lockean
assumptions are morally and philosophically impoverished by their failure to see the requirements laid
on an adequate theory of toleration by genuinely Lockean terms.
Sometimes it happens that a philosophical theory becomes so well known 
that the concerns that first motivated its articulation recede into relative obscu-
rity.When this happens, it becomes difficult to distinguish the claims that answer
to these concerns specifically – and, by opposing, end them – from those that
are complementary but have no functional role in the theory itself. One conse-
quence of this can be that a particular claim comes to be treated as the hub of
the theory, when in fact it plays only a supporting role: the real work is done
elsewhere.
So it has been with Locke’s theory of toleration. Recent discussions have vari-
ously identified the claim that persecution is ineffective as a means of instilling
true belief or the right intentions in people as the ‘principal consideration’ that
animates this theory (Waldron, 1988, p. 67; Bou-Habib, 2003, p. 611).We cannot
doubt that both claims figure prominently in Locke’s writing on toleration.Yet
in an important sense, their centrality has been taken for granted: discussion has
focused on the meaning and character of these claims in the confident pre-
sumption that Locke’s ‘subordinate’ claims fall into a pattern of subservience in
relation to the fundamental (Waldron, 1988, p. 62; Bou-Habib, 2003, p. 612).This
presumption narrows disagreement to the question of which of the claims really
is fundamental.1 Once made, we are drawn ineluctably into discussions of the
meaning and character of particular claims and the lines of argument that support
them. It is no longer possible to consider all of Locke’s claims as elements of a
theory, that is, a systematic attempt to understand and make explicit the presup-
positions of the practice of toleration.
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We need not share this presumption. It is, after all, a peculiarly recent one. Over
a century ago, D. G. Ritchie (1894, p. 175) was able to notice, if not explain, how
[a] change in the notion of what constitutes a Church, and a change in opinion
as to what is essential in religious belief and what is not, and furthermore, a dimin-
ished sense of the importance of correct intellectual conceptions about the nature
of God ... with, perhaps, some scepticism as to the possibility of attaining com-
plete certainty in such deep matters
are all necessary preliminaries to accepting Locke’s theory of toleration.Call these
preliminaries P1, P2, P3 and P4, respectively.The article takes its cue from Ritchie
and argues that these, together with a changed view of human capacities (P5),
are correlated conditions sine qua non, without which Locke’s theory is deprived
of its comprehensive explanatory power. In short, it suggests that Locke offers a
genuine theory and not a merely eclectic composition.
At the same time, it explains why toleration was a central item in Locke’s politi-
cal theory. On recent readings, toleration turns for Locke on a question of fact
– does persecution produce a particular result? This reduces the argument about
toleration to a term in a means–end relationship, with deeply unsatisfactory con-
sequences. But Locke’s theory in fact provides a paradigm for toleration as an
aspect of a genuinely philosophical view of the human mind and the human sit-
uation. The theory explains why toleration is the political consequence of our
knowledge and our moral position, not simply the default that follows from the
failure of persecution – should it fail. In reconnecting Locke’s treatment of tol-
eration to his political thought, new light is cast on his claims about persecu-
tion, and a rather broader set of considerations than has been supposed is seen
to inform his theory. These considerations respond directly to the view Locke
was opposing.
Locke’s Target
Locke’s target was an influential view of Christianity, which took the proper pur-
poses of government to include the repression of false doctrine and the promo-
tion of the true. On this view, church and state were implicated in a complicit
spiritual enterprise.Their complicity was necessary because the Fall of man had
left people incapable of self-direction and made needful the provision of direc-
tion by the heads of church and state, upon whom God had bestowed His grace.
This view was widely held in the medieval period and its influence persisted
into the seventeenth century and beyond. It was ecumenical, for it was held alike
by the Roman Church, the Church of England and most Protestant Dissenters,2
which may sound surprising but is explicable enough,because it turned on shared
assumptions made in revealed theology – assumptions which relied on certain
venerable philosophical doctrines – and applied these to political thinking.
Within this consensus, there was scope for disagreement about the kinds of direc-
tion necessary and the efficiency of some means of repression, but nearly all
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believed that the magistrate had both the right and the duty to establish true
religion within his territories, order the outward form of the church and punish
those who refused to conform (see at length Coffey, 2000).
This view was uncongenial to Locke. In An Essay Concerning Toleration (1667) he
assaulted it directly, laying down ‘for a foundation, which I think will not be
questioned or denied’ the premise that the state was a purely secular organisa-
tion which had no business either to promote or repress religious doctrine
(Locke, 1997, p. 135). Over the next 20 years, he developed a series of views that
explained the foundation he had laid down and, in doing so, articulated the
theory of toleration that in time became liberal orthodoxy. By assuming that
people were naturally adequate to self-direction, explaining this adequacy in
terms of their ability to adhere to the precepts of natural law, Locke bypassed
the older view.This assumption enabled him to rewrite the received characters
of church and state – in particular, to explain the secular character of the latter
– and thereby set their relations in new terms.These terms underwrote his mature
theory of toleration.
The theory Locke developed altered the bearings of toleration by making it the
matter of purely civil significance we nowadays take it to be. A more detailed
account of the steps by which he came to this view, as he diverged progressively
from the older view, will help us to see why, for all its familiarity, the Lockean
theory of toleration is more complex than we may readily suppose.
The Politics of Intolerance
To appreciate the complexity of Locke’s theory, we need to understand the view
it was designed to overcome.The obvious alternative to conceiving the state as
a secular organisation is to suggest that it is not limited to secular purposes, but
includes within its terms the provision of assistance to people in their spiritual
lives, even if this assistance is directed at the way they conduct themselves on
earth. This assistance could be conceived necessary if it were supposed that,
without it, people would be unable to conduct themselves in the manner
required by God. This supposition would make sense if there were postulated
some pervasive incapacity in people that made such conduct impossible without
institutional support, that is, the combined support of the church and the state.
Considered in these terms, the state might be understood as a Christian organi-
sation, one implicated in a central Christian purpose. So understood, its purposes
would not be confined to protecting people in this life but would extend to
preparing them for the next.
The implications of this for the question of toleration are not far to seek.Tolera-
tion is usually understood nowadays as the attempt by the state to manage a
modus vivendi between different and sometimes conflicting opinions about the
good life. The state is conceived as the neutral arbiter of these conflicts (see
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Mendus, 1989; MacIntyre, 1990, pp. 133–55). But ‘the Question of Toleration’,
as Locke understood it, was ‘whether the Magistrate shall tolerate different
Churches’ (Locke, 1681, f. 7); and the assumed complicity of church and state in
upholding Christian truth suggests a negative answer to this question.The state
has a responsibility to use the means at its disposal to extirpate false doctrine and
promote salvation: it has a spiritual purpose, which it serves by upholding the
true church.This makes toleration intellectually problematical, because the spiri-
tual purpose of the state necessarily would be crossed were indulgence granted
to those who professed false doctrine.
The obvious response to this problem from those seeking toleration was to indi-
cate that they asked it only for those who, like themselves, professed true doc-
trine, not those who professed the false. At least, this was the response of those
who, in Locke’s day, found insuperable obstacles in conscience to their commu-
nicating with the Anglican Church: we find John Owen insisting that ‘[i]t is only
the liberty and protection of the children of God as such that is pleaded for’,
and Richard Baxter demanding toleration only for ‘Protestants that fear ... guilt
... should they do that which [the Anglican Church] confess indifferent’ (Baxter,
1680, p. 107; Owen, 1965–68,Vol.VIII, p. 422). But why should they need the
indulgence that toleration granted them when they were already communicants
in the true church? This was the question that Roman Catholic apologists had
persistently asked of the Church of England since the Reformation, and that the
Church of England’s apologists now asked of the Dissenters. To allow them to
separate was to condone and, by implication, to concede the ground of ecclesi-
astical truth: in Samuel Parker’s words, to convict the Church of England ‘of
illegal and unwarrantable Usurpation and allow the Pleas of the Dissenters just
and reasonable’ (Parker, 1684, p. 175).The established church could not alter its
practices without throwing its own claim to truth into doubt; in a like way, the
tolerant magistrate would be admitting his failure to uphold the true church in
his kingdom even as he brought down the wrath of God upon it.Thus Roger
L’Estrange could write that ‘for the Dissenters to desire Toleration is to ask a thing,
which it were impious to allow, and which they have sworn to hinder all they
can, a thing that sets up the Kingdom of Hell’ (L’Estrange, 1685, p. 6). Similar
intuitions have been operative since.
L’Estrange assumed that the Church was in possession of the truth.The Angli-
can claim was that God had settled the Church of England in its present form
under the headship of Christ, and that from this source gracious benefits were
received. These were passed, in the first instance, to those He had deputed to
govern the Church; those who were outside this Church could receive no
benefit. Because marked by objective evidences of its truthfulness (see Wood-
house, 1954), those who remained outside could not but be guilty of some moral
or intellectual defect. This defect, evidently, made them incapable of guiding
themselves properly. Consequently, the civil power should guide them, if neces-
sary by force, into its gracious bosom.
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These terms naturally suggest a paternal account of government, for if people
are reckoned to be like children, lacking the capacities for rational self-direction
necessary to conduct themselves well, direction has to come from somewhere
else. ‘The Prince, whom you may justly call the Father of the country’, wrote
Jean Bodin, was ‘ordained and sent unto us by God’ to provide for the tempo-
ral and spiritual needs of his whole people, while John Overall argued that ‘[a]s
it was then the duty of Parents, so by the law of nature, was it of good kings and
civil magistrates, to bring up their children and subjects in the true service and
worship of God’ (Overall, 1844,p. 29;Bodin, 1949,p. 325).Absent on this account
is any notion of express consent by those directed. Instead we find the pervasive
presumption that people do not choose to be members of a particular church
but are born into it, as in Roger Coke’s claim that Charles II’s subjects were
‘Born and Baptized in a Christian Church’ and Edward Stillingfleet’s casual ref-
erence to ‘the Church we live in’ (Coke, 1660, sig.A. 2; Stillingfleet, 1687, p. 11).3
The paternal account supposed that the grace that settled on the magistrate as
head of the visible church gifted him superiority in understanding, which in turn
entitled him to direct others. This is why William Sherlock could attribute to
‘the Providence of God’ the blessing of ‘a wise and virtuous Prince’ (Sherlock,
1684, p. 120). His direction was necessary because the Fall had left people unable
to conduct themselves in the manner God required out of their natural resources.
The gift of grace enabled the magistrate to guide people into an external con-
formity with God’s wishes.This guidance might well extend to the use of coer-
cion in religion, in enforcing conformity to the church into which they were
born.
We might think that coercing people into religious observance contradicts the
requirement revealed in the Decalogue and epitomised in the golden rule that
actions be performed out of a loving disposition, that is, with the right inten-
tions. But if it were supposed that the Fall had so deranged people’s moral per-
ception that they were unable to turn themselves towards the good unassisted,
coercion might be usefully employed to direct them towards it, whereupon, it
was to be hoped, God’s intercession would bring about the appropriate disposi-
tion in their soul through the gift of His grace.Thus coercion could be a useful
ancillary to Christian belief, where the internal inclination to the good in people
was lacking (Harris, 2002,Vol. I, p. 194).
On this line of thought, indeed, the coercive direction provided by the magis-
trate is vital, because without it even the civil order might not be sustained. Grace
is thus the precondition to any rational conduct whatever, including conduct
that upholds civil society. In this sense, true religion could be thought to support
the state quite as much as the state was conceived to support true religion. By
the same token, unless the state did its part of the bargain and upheld the true
religion, the support it needed from that quarter would not be forthcoming. ‘To
forsake the true God of heaven’ wrote Richard Hooker, ‘is to fall into all such
evils upon the face of the earth, as men either destitute of grace divine may
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commit, or unprotected from above endure’ (Hooker, 1855,Vol. I, p. 431). Man’s
‘worldly estate’, Hooker indicated, was dependent upon divine grace and so
dependent too upon the support the state provided to the true church, not least
because the terrestrial benefits that it provided turned on its being true: God was
unlikely to provide benefits to a body that did not promote His religion.Thus
Baxter could complain that ‘their doctrine is trayterous and intolerable who
affirm ...That the Magistrate have nothing to do with matters of Religion, but
are to leave all men to their consciences, and govern us as men, and not as Chris-
tians, Churches or Ministers’ (Baxter, 1994, p. 171). Once an understanding of
the church as a repository of divine truth into which man is born is allied to a
conception of the state as a body dependent upon the workings of divine grace
for its sustentation, it is difficult to deny that the magistrate has a direct interest
in spiritual matters.
The Politics of Toleration
Locke denied this interest. He could do so because he understood the church
differently (P1). He indicated that people were not simply born into churches:
all were in principle capable of guiding themselves in their choice of church;
indeed, this responsibility they could not cede to another. As he put it in 1681,
it was ‘part of my liberty as a Christian & a man to choose of what church or
religious societie I will be as most conduceing to the salvation of my soule of
wch I alone am judg & over wch the magistrate hath noe power at all’ (Locke,
1681, f. 74), a view which implied that the choice of joining, indeed of forming
a church could be made by people’s natural endowments: coercion by the mag-
istrate was unnecessary.The claim to possession of truth by the church was coun-
tered with the suggestion that this truth could not be known to be the possession
of one particular church.To claim knowledge of revealed truth ex hypothesi was
unreasonable, as it could not be known with certainty (Locke, 1990, pp. 63–5).
Equally, no one individual was naturally better placed than another to come to
a definite judgement about it: the magistrate and the clergy did not enjoy better
access to revealed truth than the laity (P4).
This was not to deny the existence of such truth.That there was a true religion
Locke seems never to have doubted, but it was not the exclusive possession of a
particular church.When pressed on this point by Jonas Proast, Locke’s reply was
tortuously worded to avoid, as it seems, any direct admission that the Church of
England was the one true church (Locke, 1823, Vol. VI, p. 326).4 As he had
observed elsewhere, all churches claimed truth to themselves, ‘& upon the same
authority, for they are all men that say it endowed with like facultys to know
themselves & subject to the same frailtys of mistakeing or imposeing’ (Locke,
1681, f. 87). On this basis, claims that the order of a particular church had been
instituted by God and reflected His intentions were ripe for revision. Locke
implied that church order was the product of human invention. It embodied no
intrinsically authoritative model, only the dispositions of those who constructed
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it.This explains his otherwise unintelligible assertion that ‘the chief characteris-
tic mark of the true church’ was toleration (Locke, 1963, p. 6).5
Locke’s reflections undercut not only the Anglican case but also that of the Dis-
senters who shared Anglicanism’s understanding of the church and its relation to
the state, though not its assessment of what the visible form of that church should
be. But their implications for the view of the state that completed this case were
not less telling. If God’s gracious support were supposed unnecessary to the con-
struction and maintenance of ecclesiastical society, why should it be supposed
necessary to the construction and maintenance of civil society? If people’s natural
powers were adequate to one, it made sense to assume that they were adequate
to the other.This, at any rate, was the assumption that lay behind Locke’s expla-
nation of the secular character of the state in Two Treatises of Government. Thus
Locke’s treatment of ecclesiastical society implied a correlative treatment of civil
society. This treatment explained, as opposed to merely premising, the secular
nature of the state.6 The premise had been a brute assertion in 1667, but the
status now attributed to the church decisively altered its relation to the state and
made an explanation possible. It did so because it implied that the state had no
business to promote or to protect religion, true or otherwise. If questions of
revealed truth did not bear directly on the relations of church and state, a role
for the state in upholding such truth would be impertinent.
This was not to say that God’s requirements were irrelevant to the state. It was,
however, to insist that the relevant requirements were not spiritual, which meant
that church and state could not be thought complicit in a spiritual purpose.
Instead, the state’s purposes could be conceived in terms of divine requirements
with a purely secular bearing.This conception enabled Locke to locate his long-
held assumption that the conditions of terrestrial existence and the individual’s
inability to master these alone pointed the need for civil government (Locke,
1954, p. 210) in an explanatory framework in which God’s intentions figured
centrally. Because the intentions were God’s, the authority of the state was
secured; because they concerned only life on earth, its secular character was 
guaranteed.
On Locke’s analysis, those intentions, described in Two Treatises as ‘the great
Design of God’ (Locke, 1988, p. 170) and earlier as His ‘gracious divine purpose’
(Locke, 1954, p. 156), coincided with the satisfaction of mankind’s natural needs.
They involved the increase of humanity as a species and its dominion over the
earth and its lower creatures to the degree needed to fulfil this purpose (Locke,
1988, p. 170). Natural law articulated these purposes as rationally apprehensible
authoritative commands; the relevant commands were, in principle, apprehensi-
ble to all because their intellectual faculties were naturally adequate to infer them
(P5). What is more, these faculties were identical, which suggested that natural
superiority of intellectual endowment could not be posited as a ground for
holding one individual as fit to direct others better than they could direct them-
selves (Locke, 1988, p. 287).7
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In an obvious way, this suggestion follows from the presumed fact that natural
law articulates God’s purposes: because wise,He would not set purposes to people
without also supplying the means to their attainment.These included not only
the powers of intellect and will sufficient to the task (Locke, 1988, p. 324), but
also the rights to life, liberty and property that served these purposes and with
which Locke’s thought is everywhere associated.And because everyone, ruler as
well as ruled, could know and had to answer to these purposes, a form of civil
government was implied which protected people’s lives, liberties and property.
Civil government was limited to specific purposes: it had no authority to pursue
others inconsistent with those articulated in the law of nature.
The limits to the authority of government were, so to speak, horizontal and ver-
tical. No government had authority that exceeded either in extent or in degree
the limits God’s purposes set.The second limitation precluded absolutism.As part
of the Lockean triumvirate, God had granted each individual property in his own
person, a grant made on the condition that His purposes be pursued (Locke,
1988, pp. 286–8, 291).This being so, it could not be supposed that anyone had
unconditional dominion over himself. By parity of reason, it would never be pos-
sible for people to give up that degree of control to another human being. ‘For
no Body’, as Locke said, ‘can transfer to another more power than he has in
himself; and no Body has an absolute Arbitrary Power over himself, or over any
other, to destroy his own Life, or take away the Life or Property of another’.This
was because ‘Men being all the Workmanship of one Omnipotent, and infinitely
wise Maker ... are his Property, whose Workmanship they are, made to last during
his, not one anothers Pleasure’ (Locke, 1988, pp. 271, 357; compare Harris, 2002,
Vol. I, p. 203). Thus, no terrestrial authority could claim absolute power over
them.
The first limitation, which is less often emphasised, justified toleration.8 Because
civil government was concerned with secular purposes only, matters that went
beyond these purposes were irrelevant to its activities. From this, Locke inferred
that the coercive powers the civil government had at its disposal could not be
properly turned to spiritual affairs. Certainly, coercive powers belonged to a
Lockean government, but the conditions on which they were entrusted to it
derived from the rights that inhered to each of the governed, and these rights
related only to matters secular in character. The duties to self-preservation and
the preservation of others under natural law, from which they were inferred,
referred to the preservation of terrestrial life (Locke, 1988, pp. 352–3).Therefore,
the coercive power of civil government could not be thought applicable to spir-
itual matters as such. It could be exerted against threats to civil life that claimed
a spiritual inspiration, but against the practical threat only.9 It is against this back-
ground that Locke’s infamous denial of toleration to Roman Catholics should
be understood. Although nothing in the civil government’s powers warranted
their application to the religious opinions and practices of Catholics per se, politi-
cally speaking Catholicism was an international conspiracy bent on subverting
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life, liberty and property. This made it intolerable.As he wrote, ‘if the Papists are
punished for any thing but for being subjects to a Prince that hath declard enmity
& warr to us I think they have hard usage’ (Locke, 1681, f. 26; see also Coffey,
2000, p. 186).
In this way, Locke’s explanation of the secular state anchored his view of tolera-
tion.This explanation, which confined the state’s jurisdiction solely to the care
and advancement of terrestrial goods, told against any account of political author-
ity that included not only secular but spiritual concerns in its terms.Absolutism
on the Hobbesian model, which gave the sovereign the right to determine the
public profession of religion, and the paternalist model favoured by mainstream
Anglicanism, which gave the civil magistrate supremacy over all persons, ‘in all
Causes, as well Ecclesiastical as Civil’ were equally objectionable from this per-
spective (Hobbes, 1651, p. 116; Stillingfleet, 1662, pp. 130–1). On Locke’s
account, the terms of civil government did not embrace the spiritual concerns
that would make so general an attribution of authority plausible.
In a complementary way, he denied that the civil magistrate had any privileged
understanding of ecclesiastical affairs or that his office gave him special access to
spiritual truth. In An Essay Concerning Toleration, Locke had suggested that
between the magistrate and his subjects, ‘in respect of the king of kings, there is
but a small and accidental difference’, he ‘not being made infallible in reference
to others by being made a governor over them’.The point was repeated, pithily,
in Two Treatises: ‘Absolute Monarchs’, Locke wrote, ‘are but Men’ (Locke, 1988, p.
276; 1997, pp. 141, 143). His argument presupposed that all men and women
had been created with equal intellectual capacities. A common dominion over
the earth was posited on this basis. Other things equal, this implied that domin-
ion could not accrue to a single individual in virtue of a natural superiority of
understanding. In his writings on the human understanding, meanwhile, Locke
had quietly severed the connection between knowledge and grace. Grace, as he
conceived it, worked to deepen faith, not to increase knowledge, and so could
not be adduced as a basis for postulating supernatural superiority of understand-
ing and thence dominion.10 The monarch’s claim to know better than his sub-
jects was thus dispatched.Without this, it became impossible to infer confidently
that an absolute monarch, exercising authority over every aspect of secular and 
spiritual existence, was necessary.
Coercion, Persecution and Belief
In Epistola de Tolerantia (1689) Locke observed that
No peace and security, no, not so much as common friendship, can ever be estab-
lished or preserved amongst men, so long as this opinion prevails, that dominion is
founded in grace, and that religion is to be propagated by force of arms (Locke, 1963,
p. 38).
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These propositions, as he well understood, were aspects of a single picture in
which the weakness of human nature called for the gracious support of God.
This was taken to involve a condition in which the true church, the vessel of
God’s grace, required the assistance of the state in its task of salvation, while the
state itself needed to engage the services of the true church. Locke’s assumption
of natural man’s adequacy to the construction of civil and ecclesiastical society
made this picture redundant. He suggested that church and state were parallel
rather than complicit. This required, logically, that they be conceived as inde-
pendent. Locke could conceive them in this way because he treated both as ratio-
nal constructions, though constructions answering to different purposes. This
treatment was possible, in turn, because the people who constructed these soci-
eties had powers of intellect and will sufficient to the task.The contrast with the
picture Locke was eschewing could not be clearer. Having said this, two con-
nected points deserve special emphasis.
The first is that the structural relations of the picture Locke rejected should make
us wary of casually equating the coercive use of state power with persecution.
For coercion in these terms was not the systematic infliction of punishment on
people who held a particular religious belief, so much as the application of the
external stimuli necessary to direct those who could not adequately direct them-
selves to the truth. That is to say, it was assumed to be for the good of those
directed, for these external stimuli were the means by which they were directed
into the church, whose grace was to necessary to their conducting themselves
as God required.
These terms nowhere assumed that coercion was the first act in a seamless causal
story culminating in the acquisition of either true or sincere belief by the coerced
(compare Waldron, 1988, p. 82; Mendus, 1991, pp. 151–5; Bou-Habib, 2003, p.
616). Coercion was supposed a necessary but insufficient condition of acquiring
such beliefs, because, as its proponents acknowledged, internal states were inac-
cessible to human authority. Acts of the intellect stood to the will as cause to
effect; the will could be deflected by coercive means, but the intellect was dis-
posed in one way or another by God, and could not be compelled by mundane
agencies.As Robert Sanderson put it,‘Almighty God has committed to the mag-
istrate the government of the outward man: but He has reserved to Himself alone
the knowledge and judgement of internal acts, and the scrutiny of human hearts
and sway over them’ (Sanderson, 1851, pp. 273–4, my translation).The purpose
of coercion was to push the recalcitrant, fallen man into a position in which he
might receive the grace that could inculcate true and sincere belief. Even on the
persecutors’ understanding, belief itself could not be coerced.Thus Baxter could
write that
[t]hough Magistrates cannot force men to Believe, Love God, and so to be saved,
yet they must force them to submit to holy Doctrine, and learn the Word of God,
and to walk orderly and quietly in that Condition, till they are brought to a vol-
untary personal profession of Christianity (Baxter, 1994, p. 163).
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It seems strange, then, to suggest that Locke regarded the claim that true belief
could not be coerced as a ‘knock down argument against the use of political
means for religious ends’ (Waldron, 1988, p. 84), not least because he had made
use of this claim himself in an earlier context while arguing for the right of the
magistrate to impose religious uniformity.11 In the same context, we may add,
he had conceded that God ‘abhors the sacrifice of the hypocritical compliant’,
which suggests that he was also happy at one time to acknowledge the impor-
tance of the right intentions in people even as he ‘allow[ed] the government to
coerce them into its favoured religion’ (Locke, 1967, p. 145; Bou-Habib, 2003,
pp. 619–20).
The mistake here is to suppose that Locke’s theory depends upon the episte-
mological premise that coercion is insufficient to inculcate true or sincere belief;
that his defence of toleration proceeded from the claim that persecution was irra-
tional because it could not instil belief – of whatever description – in people at
all. As it happens Locke thought that it was insufficient to this end, but there
again, so did most, if not all of his contemporaries. His concern, rather, was to
show that coercion was not a necessary condition of inculcating true or sincere
belief: to deny that ‘religion is to be propagated by force of arms’. He did this,
in general terms, by assuming the natural adequacy of human capacities to the
purposes God had set to them.This ruled out of court the view of human deprav-
ity on which the necessity of persecution was supposed to rest. But he paused
to highlight the incoherence of the persecutors’ position.As he reminded Proast,
‘Force ... without grace, you acknowledge, can do nothing; but joined with
preaching and grace, it can prevail. Why then, I pray, is it a more competent
means than preaching; or why necessary?’ If ‘the grace of God is the only ... effi-
cacious means, without which all human means is ineffectual’, this in fact
excluded ‘all the human means of force from being necessary, or so much as
lawful to be used: unless God hath required it by some more authentic declara-
tion than your bare saying or imagining it is necessary’ (Locke, 1823,Vol.VI, pp.
508–9). It was unlawful because natural law circumscribed the powers of civil
government, confining it to secular purposes. The positive law of revelation,
meanwhile, indicated that religion was to be propagated ‘not by force nor Con-
straint but by preaching & perswasion’ (Locke, 1681, f. 84; compare 1823,Vol.
VI, p. 508).These were authentic declarations of God’s requirements.
Put more pointedly, neither the claim that coercion is irrational nor the claim
that it cannot instil the right intentions in people is central to Locke’s theory.
Pace Waldron, it is not the case that Locke is ‘concerned only with the rational-
ity of persecution’, or that his ‘case falls apart’ if force can be shown to be effi-
cacious (Waldron, 1988, p. 81). His theory is meant to show not that coercion is
irrational, although he thinks it is, nor that it cannot make people believe sin-
cerely, although he thinks it cannot, but that it is not ‘necessary, or so much as
lawful to be used’. It does this by postulating the natural adequacy of human
beings to know and pursue God’s purposes, and outlining an understanding of
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civil government as limited to certain of those purposes. Because the purposes
are secular, civil government cannot lawfully make use of the means at its dis-
posal for ends that are not secular.This has the counter-intuitive, but important,
consequence of making Two Treatises of Government the decisive ‘tolerationist’ text
in the Lockean canon.12
Second and connectedly, the equation of coercion with persecution only makes
sense when people are assumed to be naturally adequate to direct themselves 
as God requires. That is to say, the assumption of a natural adequacy to self-
direction is the necessary precondition for explaining why the use of coercion
in religion as such is a species of persecution. Such an assumption is necessary
to taking the cognitive claims of religion consistently seriously: people must be
supposed able to form true and sincere beliefs out of natural resources and capac-
ities common to all if those beliefs are to be regarded (in principle) as equally
worthy of respect.Without this assumption, it is difficult to explain why the limits
of toleration should extend in principle to every human being.
The Theology of Intolerance
We have seen that a change in the notion of what constitutes a church (P1),
predicated on a decided view of human capacities (P5) and combined with a
cognitively humble approach to questions of religious truth (P4) are precondi-
tions of Locke’s theory of toleration. What of the other conditions identified
above? How, it may be wondered, do these relate? The relevant conditions, to
recollect, were a change in opinion as to what is essential in religious belief (P2)
and a diminished sense of the importance of correct intellectual conceptions
about the nature of God (P3). Perhaps surprisingly, it becomes apparent that these
two conditions (P2 and P3) are implied by the other three. To be specific, they
follow directly from the deprecation of the church’s claim to embody truth and
the changed relation between church and state that emerges as its logical pendant.
For it turns out to be impossible even to moderate this claim without wreaking
havoc in a department of thought we might think unconnected to the relations
of church and state, namely, revealed theology. And this brings us directly to P2,
and subsequently, to P3. As yet, this may seem a little opaque.To clarify matters,
we should return to original sin.
One account of original sin had it that all mankind was involved in sin through
Adam’s defection, to the degree that people could not be expected either to
direct themselves adequately or to obtain salvation on the basis of their own per-
formances. Therefore, guidance both civil and ecclesiastical was required. That
guidance was conceived in terms that implied that God’s direct assistance was
necessary to uphold civil society, and that the church, because the vehicle of His
truth, laid a claim upon the support of the state. As the state was supported
directly by God, the complicity of coercion and grace and its central place in
the workings of state and church becomes obvious.The assumption of people’s
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natural adequacy to self-direction bypassed this picture and implied a revision of
the relations of church and state. Locke’s view of toleration, we have seen, rested
on the revision of these relations.The revision entailed treating the church and
state as parallel rather than complicit, and this was made possible by treating both
as rational constructions that did not require divine support. In this way, their
relation was set on a different basis.
The implications of this revision for the theological superstructure erected upon
the earlier base were no less radical. For the notion of original sin, which under-
wrote the complicity of church and state, implied corresponding views about
other items of Christian doctrine. More exactly, it implied a view of the deity
of Christ, and so also of the Incarnation and the Trinity.This will be seen most
easily if we briefly survey Edward Stillingfleet’s views on these topics.
Stillingfleet insisted that all mankind was involved in sin, in consequence of the
Fall. All were involved, because Adam was ‘a publick Person ... not merely by
Nature’ but ‘by Representation’ (Stillingfleet, 1735, p. 356). This supposed not
merely that had human nature been depraved by his sin, but that all were in him
and sinned with him when he sinned, and so were juridically liable for its con-
sequences.13 Stillingfleet’s theory of atonement suggested that through the work
of Christ, and specifically in his death, a satisfaction or reparation was made to
God on account of this sin.That is to say, the merits of Christ were taken to be
sufficient to atone in some way for the sins of all mankind.‘The blood of Christ,’
he wrote, ‘is to be looked on as a sacrifice of Atonement for the sins of the
World’, adding elsewhere that ‘Christ did Exercise his Priestly-Office in the 
Oblation of himself to God upon the Cross’ (Stillingfleet, 1710,Vol. I, p. 86,Vol.
III, p. 311, compare pp. 307–8). Christ’s priestly office enabled him to offer a sac-
rifice for sin, while his merits were sufficient to atone for the sins of all mankind
because he was at once human and divine.The divinity of Christ turned on his
being of one substance (homoousios) with God. As Stillingfleet put it, ‘the three
Persons of Father, Son and Holy Ghost’ each had ‘distinct Subsistences, and incom-
municable Properties, and one and the same divine Essence’ (Stillingfleet, 1697, pp. 111,
119). In the Incarnation, the ‘divine Person’ of Christ had ‘come down from Heaven
and take[n] our Nature upon Him’, by way of a hypostatical union of the sort
that ‘we all grant to be so between Soul and Body’, and suffered for the sins of
mankind. In so doing, he had not only released mankind from the captivity of
sin and shown that God was willing to receive people ‘into favour upon the
terms which are declared by the Doctrine of Christ’, but had also abrogated the
ceremonial Law of the Old Testament (Stillingfleet, 1710,Vol. III, pp. 339, 355–6).
In Stillingfleet’s words, through Christ’s death, ‘believers were freed from that
Yoke of ceremonies’ (Stillingfleet, 1662, p. 17). Thus the freedom enjoyed in
matters of religious ceremonial, the central focus of seventeenth-century debates
about toleration, was part of people’s Christian liberty, that is, the liberty pur-
chased for them by Christ’s atoning sacrifice.
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Addressing the relations of conscience and the civil order in terms of Christian
liberty, therefore, entailed a mode of thought in which the relations of church
and state implied a series of definite views in revealed theology. No doubt this
helps to explain the interminability of these debates (see Coffey, 2000, pp.
78–196). Few of Locke’s contemporaries were inclined to escape this mode of
thought.Although examples might be multiplied, Stillingfleet is a typical figure:
throughout his intellectual career, he viewed the question of freedom of 
conscience in terms of Christian liberty, deployed the standard of indifferency
when discussing the relations of conscience and civil order and assumed the co-
direction of church and state demanded by the frailty of human nature (compare
Stillingfleet, 1662, pp. 42–6; 1682, pp. lxxxi–lxxxviii; 1735, pp. 346–56).
The Theology of Toleration
In his earliest writings, Locke too made Christian liberty the functional category
by which liberty of conscience was assessed. In Two Tracts (1660), he wrote of it
being ‘purchased [Christians] by our saviour’,which bespeaks the (probably unre-
flective) acceptance of a theory of atonement of the sort held by Stillingfleet
(Locke, 1967, p. 131).This was matched by a pessimism about the human capac-
ity for good: ever ‘since man first threw himself into the pollution of sin, he
sullies whatever he takes into his hand, and he that at first could make the best
and perfectest nature degenerate cannot fail now to make other things so too’.
Clearly, this is an allusion to the Fall, though the liability of original sin and the
precise character of its consequences are not explained. Nor did Essays on the
Law of Nature clarify these matters, Locke remarking that the Fall, whatever its
consequences, was irrelevant to the subject he was addressing (Locke, 1954, p.
138; 1967, p. 155).
But from the Essays onward, his writings were irreconcilable with any extreme
view of people’s moral debility on account of the Fall. If human nature had been
damaged, the damage was not thoroughgoing, for in principle people retained
both the ability to conduct themselves in accordance with natural law and the
degree of understanding required to ‘Enroll themselves in the Kingdom of Jesus
the Messiah, and profess themselves his Subjects’ (Locke, 1954, pp. 156–8; 1988,
p. 324; 1999, pp. 118, 158).The view these writings developed, that every indi-
vidual was responsible for guiding himself or herself, was incompatible with the
idea that Adam could have represented all of mankind at the original point of
human history.That representative role was explicitly denied in The Reasonable-
ness of Christianity (Locke, 1999, pp. 5–11).When he came to address the ques-
tion of original sin and related items of revealed theology in the 1690s, Locke
indicated that the consequences of original sin for Adam’s descendents were those
specified in Genesis, ejection from Eden and physical death, while the ubiquity
of ‘coviteousnesse pride & ambition’ he attributed to ‘fashen & example’, not to
any substantial corruption of human nature (Locke, 1693, f. 113). Besides, Locke’s
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conception of personhood omitted any positive role for substance, which made
it hard to explain how every person could have been damaged by the Fall.
The same conception told against the presence of a generic sin in mankind for
which Christ could be supposed to satisfy or atone. The role of Christ would
therefore need reassessment. Locke argued in 1695 that his role was to restore
people to immortality if through their righteousness they ‘might have a Title’ to
it.Thus ‘if any of the Posterity of Adam were just, they shall not lose the Reward
of it, Eternal Life and Bliss, by being his Mortal Issue: Christ will bring them all
to Life again’ (Locke, 1999, p. 12). How was this the case? Given people’s inabil-
ity to abide rigorously by God’s law in practice, and thereby be accounted right-
eous, He had interposed with a new order of things, the ‘law of faith’, by which,
where people were unable to fulfil the obligations of natural law,‘Faith is allowed
to supply the defect of full Obedience; and so the Believers are admitted to Life
and Immortality as if they were Righteous’ (Locke, 1999, p. 19).This law of faith
completed rather than replaced the law of nature, compensating for people’s
defective performance of that law through faith. And the faith which God
counted as righteousness was the faith that Jesus was the Messiah sent by Him
(Locke, 1999, pp. 22–36).
To believe that Jesus is the Messiah does not require one to take a decided view
of his divinity or humanity.Neither does this belief obviously demand that Christ
has sacrificed himself in propitiation for our sins, which helpfully alleviates the
need to acknowledge his priesthood (of which Locke was uncertain)14 or to
explain his divinity.The minimalism of this doctrine stands in pointed contrast
to the baroque architecture of Stillingfleet’s theology; and thus we arrive at P2.
From here, the move to P3 is straightforward. Christ’s divinity is predicated on
his consubstantiality with God: He is of ‘one and the same divine Essence’. Once
the requirement to explain his divinity is removed, it is unnecessary to adopt a
position on just what this essence might be.15
Concluding Remarks
Locke’s theory of toleration is complex. A view of the church, in its relation to
the state, as a product of human devising (P1), of religion as narrow in its doc-
trinal requirements (P2), agnostic about the nature of God (P3) and modest
enough to be functionally independent of the state (P4), and of human beings as
made by God with faculties naturally adequate to the purposes for which He
made them (P5) are its central components.These components, suitably related,
comprise a comprehensive liberal theory of toleration. Together, they explain
why all beliefs and actions with a purely spiritual bearing ought to be tolerated.
This implies at least two considerations, one general and one specific.
The first, and more general, is methodological.The philosophical dividend paid
by serious attention to past thought is greatest when emphasis is laid on the
complex rather than the linear.The views of all parties to a dispute need to be
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considered if the story of one party is to be told properly.We should not forget
that if Waldron and Bou-Habib find in Locke’s writings the point of departure
for wider reflections they purport to be providing accounts of Locke’s argument
against religious persecution along the way, and not in the cavalier spirit that
Richard Rorty has invited philosophers to embrace (Rorty, 1984, p. 73).To be
sure, their accounts narrate and analyse specific lines of argument in Locke’s texts,
but they give little attention to his purposes in arguing along these lines, silently
presuming that his purpose is to develop out of one fundamental premise or
other a theory capable of driving practice. It would be glib to say that the result-
ing accounts are insufficiently historical. But it is not glib to say that without a
broader sense of Locke’s purposes, conditioned but not determined by a care-
fulness for the views of parties and persuasions of opinion he sought to oppose,
it is unclear how the meaning or character of a particular line of argument can
be adequately understood, still less the connections between different lines.
This consideration disposes to the second. Locke’s theory has comprehensive
explanatory power just because it does connect a series of lines of argument.
They are connected, ultimately, by principles drawn from natural theology, which
underwrite the natural equality of capacity belonging to human beings and the
end for which civil government is constructed. If only for this reason, no con-
temporary theorist will wish to reproduce Locke in facsimile.16 But any seriously
meant contemporary theory that purposes to proceed on Lockean assumptions
must find some way to acknowledge the requirements laid on the question of
toleration by a genuinely Lockean understanding of what it involves. For a start,
it will need to adduce a suitably profane substitute for natural theology, capable
of doing the same conceptual work, assuming that arguments that depend on
the former cannot secure sufficient adherents today. Without this, the moral
element often attributed to the concept of toleration is lacking: the protections
the state affords are morally unspecific and quite unassured.17 If the problem of
modernity is to show that, in a world characterised by pluralism, persecution is
not merely inefficacious but wrong, we find in Locke, more than in any other
thinker, the articulation of the range of questions necessary for identifying the
scope of its solution.To the extent that recent discussions of his writings on tol-
eration obscure this, they do a disservice not merely to Locke but to us all.18
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1 Thus Bou-Habib argues for the replacement of one ‘principal consideration’ – the wrong one – with another
(Bou-Habib, 2003, p. 611).
2 The Quakers, for example, did not share this view.They understood the church as a purely spiritual body, con-
ceptually and organisationally sundered from the state: ‘God hath not a visible or temporall Church in the world, nor
is the Order, or Rule, or Government in the church visible, but spirituall and eternall’ (Farnworth, 1654, p. 7).This
understanding set question marks against the relation between church and state assumed on the ecumenical view.
In particular, it suggested that the church, because invisible, required no support from the state and should not be
subject to its intrusions. Arguments for toleration on this ground are present in the writings of William Penn
(1685, p. 3) and Henry Robinson, whose understanding of the church verged on that of the Quakers (Robinson,
1643, sig. A. 3-2). Although these arguments resonate with Locke’s views at various points, they proceed on a
rather different ground. I am grateful to an anonymous reader for pressing me to clarify this point.
3 As Stillingfleet indicated elsewhere, ‘an implicite consent is supposed in all such as are born under that authority’
(Stillingfleet, 1662, p. 133).
4 ‘I agree’, Locke wrote, ‘... that there is but one only true religion; I agree too that that one only true religion is
professed and held in the church of England’.
5 For the ideas of true church and true religion in Locke’s thinking, see Nicholson (1991) pp. 178–81.
6 In other words, this treatment is logically and chronologically prior to the treatment of the state developed in Two
Treatises. Waldron’s speculations about the relation between the two therefore rest upon a misunderstanding
(Waldron, 1988, p. 73) and his claim that the secular character attributed to the state is ‘the conclusion, not a
premiss’ of Locke’s argument (p. 66) a false opposition: it is both.
7 There is ‘nothing more evident, than that Creatures ... born to ... the use of the same faculties, should also be
equal one amongst another without Subordination or Subjection’. See also Locke (1990) p. 101, p. 119.
8 The exception is Harris (2002).
9 See the distinction in An Essay Concerning Toleration between practical actions and opinions rightly subject to the
magistrate’s control and ‘speculative opinions and divine worship’, which ‘have an absolute and universal right to
toleration’ (Locke, 1997, p. 136).
10 ‘Thus Faith we see is the Gift of God, and with it, when Men by Baptism are admitted into the Kingdom of God,
comes the Spirit of God, which brings Life with it: For the attaining this Gift of Faith, Men do or can do nothing,
Grace hitherto does all’ (Locke, 1987,Vol. II, p. 629n).
11 In the first of Two Tracts on Government (1660), Locke argued that states of ‘assent (whereof God hath reserved the
disposure to himself, and not so much entrusted man with a liberty at pleasure to believe or reject) being not
wrought upon by force a magistrate would in vain assault that part of man which owes no homage to his author-
ity’ (Locke, 1967, p. 127) and on this basis defended the position that imposition in the indifferent things of reli-
gious worship did not infringe the individual’s Christian liberty.
12 For a different gloss, see Waldron (1988) p. 73.
13 This view seems to have originated with Saint Augustine’s interpretation of Romans v. 12, which ‘sets aside the
supposition that the in quo of the Vulgate refers to “sin” or to “death” and infers that it must refer to Adam himself ’
(Fisher, 1897, p. 186).
14 See Locke’s notes on the Priesthood of Christ, printed in Nuovo (2002), pp. 238–41.
15 Locke was agnostic about the character of substance anyway (Locke, 1990, pp. 1–2), while the language of hyposta-
sis and homoousios, in which views on these matters were expressed, was the kind of ‘gibberish’ that would fall
under the censures of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding’s chapter, ‘Of the Abuse of Words’ (Locke, 1975,
pp. 490–508).
16 As Locke’s revealed theology answers to his natural theology, they stand and fall together.
17 This point has been noticed, from a different direction, by Mendus and Matravers (2004) pp. 38–53.
18 See Mendus and Matravers (2004) p. 52.
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